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STATEMENT OF CASE 
On July 23, 1971, the final, foundation Judgment on Stirulation herein 
was entered in the court below. The sum effect of said judgment was to 
partition certain land between the parties and to reouire that the De-
fendants-Apnellant discharae the financial obligations which encumbered 
Resoondents' share of such partitioned land in order for Respondents 
to obtain free and clear title thereof. Said final Judgment on Stipu-
lation was never appealed. 
During the period August, 1971, through February, 1975, numerous 
nleadinqs were filed and hearings held in connection with Respondents' 
efforts to have said Judgment on Stipulation enforced against the De-
fendants-Anoel lant, the latter being in default of that part of said 
judgment requiring them to discharge the financial obligations against 
Respondents' subject nroperty. 
On Aori l 8, 1975, the 1 O\•ier court executed an Order, entered on 
April 28, 1975, confirming that the Defendants-Aopellant had to dis-
charge whatever financial obligations existed aaainst Respondents' 
subject land sufficient for its release to the latter, and, granting 
Respondents' motion for leave to execute aaainst the Defendants-
Annellant relative to said obliqations. The Anril 8, 1975, Order was 
not appealed, nor a notice rendered oreserving such right of appeal 
for Defendants-Appellant. 
Subsequently, the Defendants-Appellant moved to vacate the said 
April 8th Order, which motion was denied by the lower court's Order 
dated tlovember 6, 1975, (entered November 10, 1975). An attack 
was made by Defendants-Apoellant seeking to set aside said November 
6, 1975, Order, which was denied by the court below under its Memo-
l. 
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randum Decision dated June 21, 1977, (Order thereon entered September 
2, 1977); and, said Memorandum Decision further reauired that the 
Respondents' financial claims in this action be brought current and 
embodied in a money judgment. 
Thus, in compliance with the lower court's said June 21, 1977, 
Memorandum Decision reouiring Respondents' claims to be brouaht cur-
rent by way of a money judgment herein, Respondents filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment in the sum of $98,000.00. This matter 
was heard in the court bela1•1 on July 18, 1977, and cons:itutes the 
primary subject-matter of the within aopeal being prosecuted by 
Appellant. 
DISPOSITION OF LOVJER COURT 
On September 6, 1977, after hearing Defendants-Appellant's ob-
jections to the court's proposed findings and judgment, the court b~ 
low made and entered findings and Judgment in favor of Resoondents 
on the latter's motion for partial summary judgment in the sum of 
$98,000.00. From that rulinq by the Honorable James S. Sav1aya, Judge, 
of the Summit County District Court, the Appellant has taken its 
appeal herein; and, said appeal is apparently also taken from the 
lower court's Memorandum Decision (and Order thereon dated September 
2, 1977), dated June 21, 1977, executed by the Honorable Peter Leary, 
District Court Judge. 
The other Defendants in the court below have not joined in the 
subject appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THIS APPEAL 
Respondents respectfully represent to this Utah Sunreme Court 
that the September 6, 1977, Judgment executed by Judge James S. Sawaya 
2. 
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and the tAemorandum Decision of June 21, 1977 (with Order thereon dated 
September 2, 1977) executed by Judge Peter Leary, should be affirmed 
in all particulars in this proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Under date of July 23, 1971, the court below executed a Judgment 
on Stipulation [Record: 308 ]. constituting the basic decree in this 
action. Said adjudication partitioned certain land between the parties, 
and imposed upon the Appellant, inter alias, a duty to discharge 
financial obligations that burdened the land thus oartitioned to the 
Respondents. Said Judgment on Stipulation was not annealed. 
All the lower court Defendants, including ,;ppellant, were at once 
in substantial default on their responsibilities under said Judgment 
on Stipulation 1vhich required them to ray-off the monetary obligations 
against the pronerty partitioned to Respondents. Aopellant allowed 
funds earmarked for the trust (described in the July 23, lg71, decree; 
supra.), 1-1hich funds belonged to Respondents, to be used for the 
Defendants-Appellant's benefit involving the latter's oartitioned land 
instead of the obligations called for by said decree favoring the 
Respondents. Said diversion of funds involved in excess of $200,000.00. 
[Record: All documentation during period August 1971, to March 1, 1975]. 
For said period August 1971, through February, 1975, the Respond-
ents sought to have said financial payment provisions of the original 
July, 1971, decree (supra.) enforced by the court below. Respondents' 
said claims and Appellant's purported defenses thereto comprised the 
subject-matter of various pleadings and hearings in the lower court 
during said 1971 to 1975 period. 
Although the venue of this case vested in the Summit County Dist-
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rict Court, conduct of the matter occurred mainly in Fourth Judicial 
headquarters, Provo, Utah, over 60 miles distance from the Summit 
County Clerk's office. For these reasons the filing of court orders 
and other administrative efforts were often delayed between Provo 
and Coalville Courthouse in Summit County. The disparate chronology 
of entry dates in this respect is thus reflected in the record on 
appeal. 
In consequence of all that took place during the aforementioned 
August 1971, through February 1975, time period, the court belo\'1 
executed its Order dated April 8, 1975, [Record:914-917]. Said April 
8th Order of the court below confirmed the validity, intent and 
purpose of the original Judgment on Stipulation (supra.) whereby the 
Appellant was to discharge any financial requirements necessary to 
release Respondents' land free and clear of encumbrances. Said 
April 8th Order further granted Respondents leave to execute against 
.11.ppellant for recovery of sufficient funds to accomplish such intent 
and purpose, by which Respondents' land would be released to them. 
This April 8, 1975, Order (entered April 28, 1 975) of the 10~1er court 
was not appea 1 ed, nor was the same othen-1i se preserved for appea 1 
at a later date. 
On or about May 2, 1975, one of Appe 11 ant's attorneys, David C. 
Cook, was personally informed of the aforesaid April 8, 1975, Order, 
[Record: 878 ], a copy of which Order had been previously mailed to 
said attorney's employers (Appellant's attorneys of record). Thereafter, 
a second copy of the April 8th Order was mailed to said attorney for 
Appellant since he had recently left the employ of Appellant's counsel 
of record firm, Nielsen, Conder, Henroid and Gottfredson [Record: 878 
4. 
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On May 16, 1975, Appellant's said co-counsel, David c. Cook, received 
the above mentioned second copy of the April 8th Order [Record:SQ8(4)J. 
Pursuant to the April 8th Order, the current monetary amount due 
from Appellant, then outstanding and necessary to obtain the release 
of Respondents' partitioned property, was determined and presented 
to the Summit County Court Clerk, who in turn issued a Hrit of Exe-
cution, dated May 15, 1975, in the sum of $73,653.53 [Record: 4i6 ]. 
Under date of June 5, 1975, Appellant filed a motion.which sought 
to vacate and set aside the aforesaid April 8, 1975, Order [Record:428 ]. 
On July 11, 1975, by further motion Anpellant attemnted to vacate the 
aforementioned May 15, 1975, Writ of Execution, [Record: 437 ]. 
During the Summer and Fall of 1975 several hearings ~iere held 
concerning Appellant's said June 5th and July 11th motions, (supra.) 
dealing with the court's April 8th Order and May 15th Writ [Record:809(6) 
850(9) ] . 
On November 6, 1975, the court below executed its Order denyin~ 
.~opellant's said June 5, 1975, and ,July 11, 1975, motions, which denial 
Order was entered :'lovember 10, 1975, [Record: 766 ] . 
On or about said November E, 1975, date a copy of the said Order 
denying Appellant's motions was mailed to Appellant's counsel of record, 
Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson [Record: 849 ]. 
During, and subsequent to, the proceedings concerning the issues 
embraced by said November 6, 1975, Order, Respondents attemoted to 
find assets of the Appellant in the state of Utah, without success, 
[Record: 850(8) ]. However, nearly one year later Resoondents discover-
ed certain of Appellant's assets in California. Whereuoon, a sister 
state civil action was filed in said latter state, based upon the 
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original Judgment on Stipulation herein (supra.) together with all the 
subsequent decrees and orders of the court below. 
Thus, on being surprised by Respondents' discovery of their Calif. 
ornia assets, after nearly one year's search therefor, on October 12 
' 
1976, Appellant filed its "Motion For Relief From Order Dated November 
6, 1975" [Record: 806 ] , based primarily on their claim that Appell. 
ant's previous co-counsel, David C. Cook, the employee-lawyer of 
Appellant's counsel of record, Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson, 
had not been formally served with the aforesaid ~'lovember 6, 1975, 
Order, one year earlier. No mention was made of the fact that said 
counsel of record had been _so served, just after the rlovember 6th 
Order was rendered[Record: 849 ; supra.]. Moreover, said David C. 
Cook's new employers were at no time substituted or made co-counsel 
of record for Aooellant. At all times hereinabove mentioned the fim 
of Nielsen, Conder, Henroid & Gottfredson appeared as counsel in 
this regard, in spite of David C. Cook's new employment and his sub-
mitting several documents to the lower court from his new address. 
When said Cook finally withdrew from this case, he did so as an 
individual without reference to any other firm [Record: 840 ]. 
Respondents filed a motion dated October 23, 1976, requesting the 
lower court for an order increasing the previous amount detennined 18 
months earlier (May 15, 1975, Writ; supra.), to the most recent fig-
ure due from Appellant in the sum of $98,000.00, [Record: 836 ]. 
Such latter amount resulted from additional "principal, interest and 
other costs and expenses attributable" to Appellant's obligations, as 
permitted by the lower court's April 8, 1975, Order (supra.; second 
paragraph thereof). 
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On June 21, 1977, the court below executed its Memorandum De-
cision [Record: 883 ] embracing issues raised by Appellant's Octo-
ber 12, 1976, motion (supra.) as well as Respondents' October 23, 
1976, motion (supra.). An Order based upon said Memorandum Decision 
was later entered [Record:l029 ]. 
The net effect of the lower court's ruling contained in the 
June 21, 1977, decision was to: 1.) deny Appellant's October 12th 
motion; and, 2.) require that the latest accumulated monetary 
obligations due to Respondents from the Appellant be brought current 
in the form of a money judgment, "after notice and a hearing", 
(Memorandum Decision, supra.; Page 4, last naragraoh}. 
Therefore, as of June 21, 1977, by virtue of the lower court's 
ruling on said date, there remained but one single issue to be de-
termined herein: what amount of money did Apoellant (and the other 
defendants be 1 ow) currently o~le to Respondents, in order to compen-
sate the latter for expenditures made to obtain the release of 
their property partitioned under the original Judgment on Stip-
ulation, dated July 23, 1971, (supra.)? 
In accordance with the said June 21, 1977, ruling (supra.), 
Respondents filed a motion for partial summary judgment, dated 
July 6, 1977, [Record: 919 ], seeking the latest accumulated sum 
due from Appellant, in the amount of $98,000.00. Annexed to said 
Respondents' motion were affidavits and exhibits showing: 1.) that 
Respondents had disbursed the sum of $98,000.00; 2.) that said sum 
was paid to third parties in order to obtain the release of 
specific real property to Respondents; and, 3.) that all of the 
specific property so released was part of the land described in 
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the original July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation partitioned to the 
Respondents. 
Appellant filed only one affidavit [Record: 954 ] in opposi-
tion to Respondents' aforesaid motion for oartial summary judgment. 
Nowhere in said affidavit, entitled: "Affidavit of Robert lo/. Ensign", 
(supra.), filed as a purported response to Resrondents' motion, does 
the same contradict the specific, limited facts set forth in the 
Respondents' supporting affidavits and exhibits annexed to their said 
motion for partial summary judgment [Record:921-935]. 
Instead, Appellant addressed itself to factual issues outside 
the scope of the limited, material facts recited by Respondents in the 
latter's supnorting affidavits and exhibits. 
Because of the justification stated in Respondents' said supper~ 
ing affidavits with exhibits atrached, and the failure of Appellant's 
single counter-affidavit (supra.) to raise a material, factual issue 
relating thereto, the court below determined that on the undisputed 
facts, and based upon the legal obligations under the original stip-
ulated judgment of 1971 , the ,ll,pril 3, 1975, 0rder, the ilovember 6, 
1975, Order and June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision hereinbefore 
described, there was no triable issue; and, as a matter of law the 
Respondents were entitled to their summary judgment. 
On July 26, 1977, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the 
court below, granted Respondents' motion for partial summary judg-
ment, "as prayed" [Record: 958 ]. 
On July 28, 1977 Respondents submitted proposed findings and 
judgment to Appellant who then objected to the same and set the matter 
for hearing on September 6, 1977, [Record:993,999]. Respondents 
8. 
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answered Appellant's said objections in a subseouent memorandum, 
[Record: 980 ]. 
After a hearing held on September 6, 1977, concerning Appell-
ant's objections to the proposed findings and judgment form, the 
10~1er court executed said findings-judgment instrument and over-
ruled Aopellant's objections thereto, [Record: 1016 ]. 
From said Judgment of September 6, 1977, the Appellant has 
taken its appeal in this oroceeding. 
ARGUMEf'IT 
POiflT I: THE 1971 STIPULATED JUDGMEtlT MID APRIL 8, 1975, ORDER, 
FORM THE BASIS OF APPELLANT'S OBLIGATioris HEREIN, HHICH riusT GUIDE 
THIS APPEAL. 
The July 23, 1971, stipulated judgment [Record: 308 ] was not 
appealed, nor was the April 8, 1975, Order [Record :91~917 ] interpret-
i ng the same appea 1 ed, or preserved for review as required by Rule 
72 (a) and Rule 72 (b), U.R.C.P. Since the filing date for the April 
8th Order was April 28, 1975, (suora.), Appellant had until r~ay 28, 
1975, to seek an appeal or otherviise plead to protect their right of 
review thereof. Having failed to do so, Appellant is anchored to 
said decrees. 
Hence, as of April 8, 1975, whatever else had transpired in this 
case until then, such factors were immutably validated and/or merged 
into said July 23, 1971, and April 8, 1975, decrees by virtue of the 
language set forth in said latter, 1975, Order. Implicitly, the lower 
court, acting by and through the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, 
considered any and all the multitude of pleadings, evidence and argu-
ment that occurred from July, 1971 through April 8, 1975, in reaching 
9. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its decision of April 8th, 1975. 
Any attempt by Appellant to have issues reviewed in this appeal 
which were raised, or should have been raised, prior to the hearings 
and other proceedings upon which either or both said 1971 and April 
8th decreee,were based, such issues are barred, according to these 
rulings: 
" A prior judgment [or order] is res judicata on matters 1vhich 
were raised or could have been raised on matters litigated or 
litigatable" (Emphasis and brackets ours) 
Orv1it v. Bd. of Dental Examiners etc., (Calif.) 55 Cal App.2d 
388 
" The doctrine of res judicata extends not only to questions 
actually decided but to all matters which might have been 
raised or determined, anOdefenses vihich parties might)have 
oresented, whether they d1 d so or not." (Emphasis ours 
Brady v. F & C Co. of New York (Ill.) 24 NE 2d 895, 303 Ill 
App. 230 
In sunport of the foregoing doctrine of res judicata, including 
the principle of collateral estoppel, is this Utah view: 
"[l] Strictly sneaking, the term res judi ca ta aopl ies to a 
judgment betvieen the same riarties v1ho in a orior action 
litigated the identical auestions 1vhich are riresented in the 
later case. riot only are the parties bound by the rul ino on 
matters actually litioated, but thev are also nrevented from 
raising issues which should have been raised in the former 
action. The rule of law is wise in that it gives finality to 
judgments and also conserves the time of the courts ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
Richards v Hodson, (Utah 1971), 485 P2d 1044, at page 1046 
Thus, having demonstrated that the July 23, 1971 stipulated 
judgment and its implementing Order dated April 8, 1975, are the 
governing decrees in these proceedings which bar all issues prior 
to either one of them, that cannot be attacked on aopeal herein, 
the next step is to ascertain what said instruments hold relative 
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to Aorellant's financial obligations herein. A orogressive review of 
said decrees discloses the following: 
The Judgment on Stinulation 
Dated July 23, i97l 
[Record: 308 ] 
" ... it is hereby ordered that the nroperty be divided awarded 
and confirmed to the parties as follows: TO THE PLAIMfIFF: ... 
Those certain parcels ... described as follows: ... 8, 9, 10, 11 and 
12." 
(Bottom of Page 2; Top of Page 3 in judgment) 
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED ... A.) ... the defendants [Anpellant, et al.] 
shall deoosit said proceeds in a separate trust account ... said 
proceeds are to be segregated ... and aoplied only to original 
seller obligations ... by the defendants [Appellant et al.] to in-
sure performance of the ob l i ga ti ons ... " 
(Middle of Page 6 in judgment) 
SPECIAL ilOTE: Throuahout the voluminous record on appeal, too 
extensive to be reneated here, are unchallenged references and 
evidence indicatina that one or all of the defendants did collect 
the funds mentioned abov~. either directly or by borrowing on 
the "trust" (suora.) corpus, but diverted the same soley to their 
own use and benefit thereby defaulting on their obligations to 
Resoondents herein. 
"IT IS el1RTHER ORDERED that the above stated payment orocedure .. 
.... is viithout prejudice to plaintiff [Respondents] invoking all 
of its riahts and remedies aqainst defendants in the event of 
breach or default." 
(Next to last naragraph, Page 7, in judament) 
Order Dated April 8, 1975 
[Record: 914 to 917] 
" ... Judgment on Stipulation dated July 23, 197~ ....• said ~ecre:s 
are final and valid and bindina upon the parties hereto, it being 
the duty of the def~ndants [Aopellant et al .J ~o nay and ~is~harge 
the ourchase money obliaations on the land divided to plaintiff ... 
some' of vihich obligations are now in default." 
(Paqe l, First Paragraph, in !'Jrder) 
" ... defendants sha 11 certify in writing to this co~rt.:. the amo~nts 
of orincioal and interest and other costs and obl1aations attribu-
table the~eto, currently ~ue and owing upon original purchase money 
11 . 
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oblioations encomoassing land divided to said olaintiff [oespond 
ents] ... sufficient to obtain release of prorerty to said ~laintiff 
which are currently due for release ... " 
(Page l, Second Paragraph, in Order) 
" .. pla,intiffs' motion for leave to execute .. is hereby granted as 
to amounts herein referred to sufficient to discharge outstand-
ing purchase money obligations for the release of land therefr~ 
embracing land divided herein to ... [Respondents] .. " 
(Page l, Third Paragraph, in Order) 
" ... balances currently due and owing ... for the rel ease of land 
originally divided to said plaintiffs ... " 
(Page l, Fourth Paragraph; Page 2, in Order) 
The Summary Of Point I 
Therefore, the foreqoing analysis clearly indicates the validity 
and controlling nature of the July 23, 1971, Judament on Stinulation 
and Aoril 8, 1975, Order, and that /l,opellant was required to discharce 
the 111onetary obliqations aaainst "narcels ... 8, 9, li'J, 11 and 12" (sunra. 
"sufficient to obtain release of nrooerty to said olaintiff" (supra.), 
Further, " .. that the above stated payment procedure ... is without rre-
judice to nlaintiff invoking all of its rights and remedies aaainst 
defendants [Arpellant] in the event of t:reach or default .. " (supra.): 
and, that Aopellant, along with the other defendants, had indeed 
defaulted as of April 8, 1975. 
POHIT II: THE rmrl-APPEALABLE tlOVEMBER 6' 1975" ORDER REAFFIRMED THE 
PRIOR DECREES HEREIN. 
The Statement.of FaGts hereof show that the Aopellant attacked bot' 
the aforementioned April 8, 1975, Order and the l.Jrit of Execution therec 
dated May 15, 1975. Appellant's said effort was nresented by way of it 
motions dated June 5th and July 11th of that year [Record:428,437]. 
After several hearings held on said ~otions of ,June 5th and July 1: 
12. 
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during the summer and fall of 1975, [Statement of Facts], the same judge 
of the lower court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, who had executed the 
original 1971 Judgment on Stipulation as well as the April 8, 1975, 
Order, and who had heard and considered all the issues involved herein 
for the intervening four years bet~1een those decrees, overruled Appellant's 
attack thereon by denying the latter's said motions. 
Said lower court's ruling ~1as executed on Movember 6, 1975, and 
entered on Movember 10, 1975, [Record: 766 ] . However, said Order of 
rlovember 6th did not adjudicate "substantial rights" (infra.) of the 
parties, since that affirmative action had been previously accomrlished 
by the court below in its original 1971 stipulated judgment and by its 
April 8, 1975, Order, [POINT I, surra.]. On the contrary, all the lower 
court actually did vi a its November 6, 1975, Order, ~1as to refuse to 
act in the way Apoellant wished under th~ latter's motions. Overruling 
a motion and making an order that affirmatively reouires soecific 
nerformance are entirely different matters. The said November 6th Order 
neither added or subtracted anything to or from the cumulative action 
taken by the court belo~1 through the r~ay 15, 1975, \frit of Execution 
date. For these reasons we submit that the said rlovember 6, 1975, Order 
is non-appealable, based on the following decisions: 
"The overrruling of motion ..• was not a judgment or decree, ~or 
an order affecting a substantial right that in effect determ1n7s 
the action or suit so as to prevent a judgment or decree theremn, 
and is not reviewable on appeal." (Emphasis added) 
Francisco v. Stringfield, (Ore.) 114 P2d 1026, 1028 
"The overruling of a motion ... cannot be.an ord:r ~ffecting a sub-
stantial right made in a soecial proceed1ng .•• w~th1n the ~tatutory 
definition of appealable, final order, because.1n effect l~ con-
stitutes refusal to make order rather than mak1nq of order 
Swanson v. Ridge Tool Co., (Ohio) 178 ME2d 255, (Emphasis ours) 
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" .. appeal from an order 'affecting a substantial right' relates 
only to the subject matter of the 1 i ti ga ti on, and not to mere 
matters of practice. Thus, an order den in a motion to set 
aside a judgment [the facts in this appeal herein! ... is not one 
affecting a subs tanti a 1 right." (Emphasis and brackets added) 
Rahn v. Gunnison, (\./is) 12 His 528, 531 (Apparently the only 
reporting volume) 
Even if the said November 6, 1975, Order was an appealable order, 
(which it was not, supra.), the Appellant had timely notice of the 
same [Record: 849 ]. Counsel of record at that time 1-1ho had notice 
for Appellant was the firm of rlielsen, Conder, Henroid & Got':fredson. 
The fact that an employee of such firm, r~r. David C. Cook, purportedly 
did not knov1 of the Order unti 1 one year 1 ater, does not oresent the 
Aopellant 1-Jith a defense. Aside from the very unlikely notion that 
a lawyer who had made two extensive rrotions (June 5th, July 11th, suora 
would not be expected to make some kind of inquiry within a vear there-
after, as claimed by ~1r. Cook, there are other reasons \'1hy the rlovember 
6, 1975, ()rder cannot be apnealed or othel"\•1ise reviewed at this point. 
That is, Rule 73 (a), U.R.C.P. limited the period for taking an 
appea 1 from said November 6th Order to: " .. not exceeding one month fror 
the expiration of the original time" for filing the notice of appeal, 
or 60 days from the date the order complained of was entered. In any 
event, Appellant had until January 10, 1976, to take an appeal or to 
preserve its right, assuming it had obtained a proper extension of the 
first 30 day period (supra.). Appellant failed to so protect its right 
of appeal with regard to said November 6th Order, so whether or not 
the same is or is not appealable in nature can be considered moot. The 
case of Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P2d 845, 847, support> 
Respondents' analysis in this connection. 
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Thus, the subject rlovember 6th Order effectively confirmed the 
prior action of the court below in these terms: 
" ... July 23, 197~ [Judgment] ... defendants [Appellant et al.] 
were ordered to discharge certain monetary obligations to the 
original sellers of the plaintiffs' [Respondents] property are 
final and valid.ju?gments bi~ding ueon all parties •... the time 
for appeal of within proceeding having expired in the year 
1971 ... Joseph L. Krofcheck [a Respondent] .. acquired his interest 
in the aforementioned real property as a purchaser from plaintiff 
[a Responde~t] ... and as an assignee of certain rights of said 
plaintiffs in and to such judgments------defendants' motion ..• 
seeking to vac~te this court's prior order of April 8, 1975, 
and the execution thereof [May 15, 1975, Writ] ... are hereby 
denied." (Emphasis and brackets added) 
November 6, 1975, Order, court below (suora.) 
The Summary Of Point II 
The above discussion establishes that the subject November 6, 
1975, Order was probably a non-appeal able order, but, in any ev.ent, 
Appellant failed to take any action toward perfecting an apneal with-
in the time permitted by Rule 73 (a) O.R.C.P .. 
Said Order, again, validated the July 23, 1971, stipulated judg-
ment and the April 8, 1975, Order. Said ruling also reaffirmed that the 
Apnellant had to discharge the monetary obligatiuns on Respondents' 
orooerty, and in assessing such liability the Order clearly states 
that the decrees are "binding upon al 1 parties" (supra.). 
Respondent Joseph L. Krofcheck, M.D., as a judgment assignee in 
the within proceeding, is identified at this juncture in the case. 
POHIT II I: THE JUNE 21, 1977, MEMORArlDU~1 DECISION, WITH ORDER OF 
SEPTEMBER 2, 1977 THEREON, ARE NOM-APPEALABLE AND CONFIRM THE PRIOR 
DECREES HERE HJ. 
The lower court's June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision [Record: 883 J 
together v1ith its implementing Order dated Seotember 2, 1977 [Record:1029J. 
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overrule Appellant's motion that sought to vacate an order, which or~r 
itself was overruling two other motions filed by Appellant (June 5th 
and July 11, 1975) that sought to vacate still another Order (April 8 
' 
1975) and its execution. 
Only the last mentioned Order of April 8, 1975, acted on the 
"substantial rights" of the parties, v1hich Arnellant failed to aopeal. 
Like the Movember 6, 1975, Order before it (POirlT II, supra.), the 
subject June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision merely refused to act 
as to such substantial rights, by denyino action. urned by Appellant, 
(Its October 12, 197E, motion; suora: Statement of Facts). 
Hence, for the same legal reasons set forth under PO PIT II hereof, 
relating to non-appealability, the suhject iflemorandurn flecision, and 
Order thereon, are non-aooealable rulings. Only the decrees discussed 
under POHIT I are appealable, v1hich v1ere, of course, not appealed. 
Beyond the appealability issue of the said ~~emorandum Decision, 
the levier court, acting through the Honorable Peter Leary, recog-
nized it could not set aside the orior rlovember 6, 1975, iJrder of 
Judge Harding's (sunra.), a colleague on the District Court bench, 
as requested by Appellant's motion of October 12, l97G. The con-
trolling Utah decisions have repeated said rule of lav1 several 
times in the recent past.in these cases: 
Harward v. Harward, (Utah 1974), 526 P2d 1183 
Peterson v. Peterson, ( Ut. 197 4) , 530 P2d 821 
State of Utah v. r~organ, (Ut.1974), 527 P2d 225 
Leaving the said validity issue, it is necessary to observe 
exactly what effect said r·~emorandum Decision had on the within 
proceedings. Aside from denying Appellant's motion of October 12th 
(supra.), which upheld all prior decrees and orders of the court, 
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there remained essentially one question for current resolution, 
namely: 1~hat is the present monetary amount due from Appellant 
to Respondents under the lower court's decrees herein? 
Said current amount due from Appellant was claimed to be 
$98,000.00, by Respondents, before Judge Leary [Record: 836 ]. 
However, the prior Writ of Execution was for $73,653.53, 
[Record: 426 ] . 
. Therefore, Judge Leary, of the court be l 01-1, ordered that a 
hearing be held, after notice, to ascertain exactly what was due 
under the lower court's various decrees. This was the substantive, 
net effect of the subject 11emorandum Decision and Order thereon 
dated September 2, 1977. Such issue was narrowly drawn and the pro-
cedure for resolving the same spelled out by requiring a hearing 
in the future on said matter. This was the posture of the case on 
June 21, 1977, the date Judge Leary executed his Memorandum Decision. 
The Summary Of Point III 
Our foregoing evaluation shm~s that the June 21, 1977, Memor-
andum Decision and September 2, 1977, Order thereon, are most likely 
non-appealable rulings. However, despite this condition Judge Leary 
could not set aside Judge Harding's prior rulings, under Utah law, 
and of course did not do so. 
After demonstrating the propriety of Judge Leary's subject 
rulings, it is seen that only a single issue remained for current 
resolution, as of June 21, 1977, involving the amount outstanding 
due from Appe 11 ant to Resoondents under the 1 ower court decrees· 
Said matter 1-1as to be determined in a hearing, after notice thereof. 
All else stated by Judge Leary merely confirmed the prior decrees. 
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POINT IV: THE LOWER COURT'S SEPTEMBER 6, 1977 JUDGtAENT ANO FHID-
INGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ANO UTAH LM1. 
On June 21 , 1977, the 1 ower court had rendered its 1 ates t decis-
ion (POINT III, supra.) in these proceedings, to the effect that prior 
orders and decrees executed by it were valid and subsisting, and, that 
a hearing must be held to determine the current, outstanding balance 
due from Appellant (et al.) to Respondents. 
Pursuant to said edict of the court below, Respondents filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment [Record: 919 ] addressing the~ 
current question open for determi nation , to 1,,; t: how much money did 
Appellant presently owe to Respondents? 
Attached to Respondents' said motion were affidavits and exhiMb 
that clearly and unequivocally showed how much was due, on ~1hat basis 
it was due and why it was due from Appellant, inter alios. 
However, when Appellant replied to Respondents' affidavits and 
exhibits they did so with a single, self-serving affidavit which did 
not address the material facts before the lm·1er court [Record: 954 ] 
involving Respondents' motion for partial summary judament. In essence, 
here are the irrelevant points set forth in Appellant's said counter-
affidavit executed by one Robert ~I. Ensign: 
1.) Ensign Company [Appellant] is now dissolved. (COMMENT: A con· 
clusion without stating evidentiary facts; and., wholly immaterial). 
2.) Ensign Company has not had anything to do with the real prop· 
erty or fi nanci a 1 transactions which is the subject matter of the 
Respondents' motion since the fall of 1969. (CO~MENT: Two years later, 
in 1971, the within Judgment on Stipulation held Ensign Company lia~e 
as a named defendant, relative to many transactions and parcels of lanai 
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3.) Ensign Company had no dealings with funds received from the 
sale of certain real prooerty, and makes no claim on said monies. 
(CGr1MErlT: Under the July 23, 1971, judgment, Ensign~ liable for 
the funds and sale of said property, and if it did not involve it-
self with such matters it did so irresronsibly. In any case, has 
nothing to do 1-Ji th the amount of 1 i ability to P.espondents). 
4.) Ensign Company had no dealings with the Respondent Joseph 
L. Krofcheck, M.D. since 1969. (COMrUJT: Does not change or affect 
Krofcheck's status as a judgment assignee, nor Ensign's status as 
a judgment debtor). 
5. It is Robert Ensign's opinion that the subject-matter land 
is not worth $98,000.00. (CO"r1Er!T: The only noint involved is what 
it cost to obtain the re 1 ease of the oroperty, de soi te what it may 
be 1-1orth. Said allegation, ts merely Ensign's unsubstantiated opin-
ion at best.). 
6. Ensign Comoany did not encumber the Pesoondents' prooerty. 
(COMr~E'.JT: Totally irrelevant. All the documentation in the record 
admits that third parties had the encumbrances. It was Ensign's 
responsibility to pay them off). 
From the foregoing analysis of Appellant's~ counter-
affidavit, we easily see that said allegations, whether in good 
form or not, neither directly or indirectly refute the narrow 
allegations set forth by Respondents with their motion for partial 
summary judgment [Record :921-935 ], as ca 11 ed for by the 1 ower court's 
June 21, 1977, Memorandum Decision (supra.), as follows: 
A.) Parcels 8, 9, HJ, 11 and 12 described in the July 23, 1971, 
Judgment on Stipulation, is the real prooerty upon which the Apoellant 
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failed to pay the outstanding financial obligations due, as required 
by the 1 ower court's decrees. (COMMENT: Nowhere does Appe 11 ant ever 
dispute this allegation of Respondents.) 
B.) Respondents paid the sum of $98,000.00 cash to recover said 
real property, after Appellant, et al., failed to pay anything what. 
ever toward said property's release. (COMMENT: This is not denied. 
Only an unsubstantiated opinion concerning value is offered by the 
Appe 11 ant). 
, 
C.) Appellant, et al., have at no time reimbursed or other.1ise 
compensated Respondents for any nortion of the $~8,000.00 expended~ 
the latter on Appellant's obligation covered by the lower court decree1. 
(COrAMENT: Appellant has never denied this). 
Thus, Respondents' said affidavits and exhibits stand undis-
puted . .11.11 that is left for the court bel01v is to ascertain if said 
uncontroverted facts are a basis for recovery under the court's 
decrees, as a matter of law. 
Based upon the aforesaid o 1 ead i ngs and evi denti a ry ma teri a 1, a 
hearing was held on July 13, 1977, before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, of the court below. Appellant was as unresponsive to the 
materi a 1 facts presented by Resoondents' motion, as it had been 
before the hearing through the Robert W. Ensign affidavit. Hence, 
Appellant's case must rest on whatever legal effect said Ensign 
affidavit has on this case, and nothing else, respecting the 
Respondents' motion for partial summary judgment. 
Therefore, the Appellant has failed to meet the criteria 
imposed by Rule 56 (e) U.R.C.P., in nurportedly opposing the 
said motion for summary judgment, since it has failed to: "set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
20. 
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trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appronriate, 
shall be entered against him ", (Rule 56 (e), supra.). 
Appellant's said counter-affidavit is filled with opinion and un-
suo9orted conclusions, which this Utah case deems inadequate: 
" Affidavit does not comport with the requirements of this rule 
[Rule 56 (e)J where it r~veals n? ~videntiary facts but merely 
reflects the unsubstantiated o in1ons and conclusions in re-
gard to the transacti ans." (Emphasis ours 
\lalker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P2d 538 (Utah) 
Even if one were to construe Ensign's affidavit (supra.) as con-
taining some competent recitals of evidentiary fact, it certainly does 
not contain any that are material and resnonsive to Pespondents' 
affidavits and exhibits, annexed to their summary ,judgment motion. 
Cesides the main award of $98,000.00 embraced ty the lower court's 
Judgment, granting Respondents' said motion, said instrument also set 
forth fi ndi n(1s Hh i ch J\poe 11 ant has likewise attacked in the court be-
l ov1. Before defending-on the merits of such attack, the following 
doctrine should be raised: 
" The traditional function of an apnellate court is merely to 
apoly the law to findings of fact made below ... the appellate 
court is ordi na ril y ~1ithout authority to make i ndenendent 
findings ... " 
5 Am Jur2d 337, Section 900 
The specificity of the lower court's findings set forth in its 
subject September 6, 1977, Judgment, is fully supported by the record 
in this action that preceded said Judgment; and, as to those portions 
of said record particularly relied upon by the lQifer court, acting by 
and through the Honorable James S. Sawr.ya, Judge, the same were either 
unchallenged by Appellant, or were beyond challenge by reason of the 
Appellant's failure to take an appeal therefrom. 
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It follows that the next ouestion on this subject should in()uire: 
what precisely did Judge Sawaya find, and on what basis did he find it) 
Referring to said Seotember E, 1977, Judgment document itself [Reco~· 
1016 ], the outline below discloses the substance of each finding and 
the corresponding basis for the same in the record: 
Re: Findings l and 2: The validity of the lower court's nrior de-
crees, the binding effect thereof on all parties herein and the obli-
gation of Appellant and the other Defendants to obtain the release 
of Respondents' real prorerty awarded in this action, are matters 
clearly raised and adjudicated in those specific terms by some or 
all of the lower court's proceedings before entry of the said Sen-
tember 6, 1977, Judgment and findings, (See July 23, 1971 Judgment 
on Stipulation; April 8, 1975, Order; ~loverr!ber 6, 1975, Order). 
Pe: Findino 3: The fact that Aopellant's default under the lo~ 
er court's decrees would compel them to legally remedy that default, 
as provided by 1 a1·1 and enui ty, is fundarrenta 1 . Moreover, one of the 
said decrees specifically contemrlates that should .l\noellant and the 
other defendants fail to meet their l)ayrnent obligations to Pesnondents, 
"it is 1-lithout prejudice to nlaintiff [Respondents] invoking all of 
its rights and remedies against defendants in the event of breach or 
default", (See July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation, bottom of page 
7) -
Re: Findings 4, 5, and 6: The failure of the Appellant, et al., 
to meet their subject financial obligations to Resoondents as to~~ 
eels 8 through 12, Respondents' payment of $93,COO.OO to recover sue~ 
land and the fact that no part of that sum was ever reimbursed, a~ 
facts 1 eft undisputed by ,Lippe ll ant's counte r-affi davit to Respondents' 
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motion for rartial summary judgment, (See this POirlT IV, supra.). 
Re: Findinri 7: Dr .. Josenh L. Krofcheck's status as a oroper 
judgment assignee herein has never been challenged, although said 
fact was set forth in both the lower court's orders: and, also a 
direct statement thereof apneared with Respondents' motion (See 
:iovernter 6, 1975, 'lrder and i".rofcheck affidavit annexed to motion 
for rartial summary judgment, suora.). 
Re: Findina 8: The fact a change has occurred in the outstand-
ing balance due Resoondents is not disnuted, thereby necessitating 
an amendrient to the original Writ of Execution, (See June 21, 1977, 
i~emorandum Oeci s ion). 
The Summary Of Point IV 
Therefore, just ~rior to Judqe Sawaya entering the case, in the 
Su111mer of 1977, at the trial court level, there remained a single issue 
for determination, namely: 1~hat was the current outstanding balance 
due from Anoellant to Pesnondents under the nrior decrees? Thereupon, 
Respondents rresen ted their affi davits and ex hi bi ts shovli nq they had 
naid out $9s,n0ri.00 cash to recover land awarded earlier in this case, 
an obligation which really devolved unon Appellant and the other de-
fendants herein. In reoly to Resnondents' said evidence, Anoellant 
confronted extraneous issues having no material bearing on the farmer's 
motion for partial summary judgment, yet failed to dispute in any way 
Respondents' said evidence. 
After the hearing on Respondents' motion for nartial summary judg-
ment, the 1 ov1er court reviewed the files herein and developed findings 
which were founded on those oarts of the record with substantial 
evidentiary and/or judicial sunoort, thereby removing the comnetency 
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of said findings as an issue in these appellate proceedings, (5 Am 
Jur2d 337, supra.). 
By virtue of said uncha 11 enged facts presented by Respondents 
with their motion for partial summary judgment and the clear record 
before it, the lower court's September 6, 1977, Judgment and find-
ings are fully supported by Utah law. 
POINT V: 
REFUTATION. 
CERT Arn SPECIFIC DEFErJSES Ii: APPELLMlT Is GRIEF \·JARRArlT 
Re: Appellant's Claim That It 
Had flo Knowledge Of The July 23, 
1971, Judgment On Stioulation 
'.·/here Appe 11 ant asserts that it v1as not bound by the basic July 
23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation because said oarty had no kno~1ledge 
thereof, al though its counse 1 executed the same, we rr.us t observe that 
there is nothing whatever in the record on apheal to sul,stantiate this 
claim whether by Appellant's affidavit, or otherwise, nor so much asa 
hint therein that said party even makes the claim in the first olace. 
Instead, we have Aopellant's present cocounsel only nov1 raising the sai 
issue merely by \'1ay of argument herein nearly seven years after the fat: 
In addition t'ill being barred by the doctrine of laches, it should be poi! 
ed out that such issue being raised for the first time on appeal in thi 
form of argument herein is not evidence and on that basis is likevlise 
barred from consideration by this Honorable Supreme Court. 
Re: Appellant's Raising Of A Wide 
Variety Of Factual Issues 
Appellant's argument that there v1ere "crucial issues" of fact toi: 
tried which would bar entry of the subject summary judgment by the cour: 
below, fails to cite what facts 1~ere at issue that were material to thl 
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Respondents' motion for nartial summary judgment herein. There ~ias only 
one counter-affidavit presented by Anoellant opposing Resnondents' said 
motion (See Statement of Facts hereof, Pages 7-8)~ and in that document 
no such 11 crucial issues'; nor any material issue at a 11, were forthcomi no. 
However, Appellant manaqes to raise a wide variety of fac~ual issues 
in its brief which arose during the period July l, 1971, through ,January, 
1975, (See Statement of Facts hereof, Pages 3-4), involving land parcels, 
third party buyers, assignment of contracts, ad infinitum. An examina-
tion of the record on aooeal for that oeriod will disclos2 an extremel'! 
broad spectrum of such issues represented in voluminous nleadings, 
exhibits and testimony; and, the court belm: disoosed of said issues 
by virtue of its decrees rendered thereafter which decrees 1·1ere not 
aopealed nor other1~ise oreserved for appeal (See POil!TS I and II of 
this Respondents' Brief). Moreover, even if said facts ~1hich arose 
before the April 8, 1975, Order and the November 6, 1975, 0rder (sunra.) 
could be re vi e1-1ed by this Utah Supreme Court hereunder (v:hi ch they 
cannot be), to the extent such orders created ambiguity concernina 
the same, said facts would have to be viewed in a light favorina the 
Respondent. Also, 1-1hatever findings that the lower court has thus far 
rendered involving factual issues in this connection, they are to 
be similarly viewed in favor of Respondent, all as set forth in 
these statements of the rule: 
11 Viewing the evidence and all fair inferences therefrom [is d?n~] 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs [Respondents] (c1t:,ng: 
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Rd. Co., 239 P2d 163, Utah). 
Mud Control Lab. v. Covey, (Utah) 269 P2d 854, (@Page 858, 11 [5] 11 , 
first sentence; by Justice Crockett) 
In suoport of the rule: (Continued next oage) 
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11 [l] Facts must be viewed in light most favorable to resoondent," 
11 [2] Where any inference can be drawn to support findings 
reviewing court may not make determinations of factual iss~es 
contrary to those madebelow. 11 
Solomon v. Polk Dev. Co., 54 Cal Rptr 22 (Calif.) 
Thus, we recognize that the Appellant desperately tries to haff 
this Utah Supreme Court review the Aoril 8, 1975, Order, and the 
November 6, 1975, Order, both of which were based upon eviden~ary 
hearings and 2.l!_ the multi tu de of pleadings and exhibits which ore-
ceded them; and, vie have clearly shm~n that should this court be 
able to conduct such a review (which it cannot, suora.) the facts 
raised by Appellant 1·;ould in any event be determined in Resoondents' 
favcr under the legal principles set forth above. 
The net result of all the foregoing discussion indicates that 
after all of the facts raised by Appellant in its prolix argument 
were adj udi ca ted by the Aoril 8, 1975, and rlovember E, 1975, orders, 
there remained only a very narrow issue: how much money did the 
Respondents have to pay out for which the Apoellant was liable under 
the July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation? The subject motion for 
summary judgment involved only that issue and the Appellant did~ 
respond v1ith a triable i5sue of fact in its single counter-affidavit, 
(supra.)! In addition, the other defendants below have offered no law or 
facts opposing Respondents' said position,by declininq to aopeal herein. 
ARGUMENT CONCLUSION 
The substantive rights of the parties v1ere resolved by the .July 
23, 1971, Judgment on Stipulation and the April 8, 1975, Order, both 
of which decrees v1ere not appealed. These instruments form the con-
trolling basis for the within action, (POHIT I). 
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The subsequent rlovember 6, 1975, Order, the June 21, 1977, Mem-
orandum Decision and September 2, 1977, Order, in sum effect merely 
reaffirm the two contra 11 i ng decrees first above mentioned, (POirlTS 
II and I II). 
The lower court's September 6, 1977, Judgment and findings 
1-1ere a reasoned, proper extension of all that had gone on before in 
this case, fully supported by the record and applicable law thereto. 
The narrow issue raised by Resoondents' motion for partial summary 
judgment vias not addressed by Aopellant in the latter's opposition 
to said motion. Further, granting full credence to Anoellant's 
single, self-serving counter-affidavit, there was still no, triable 
issue of a material fact before the court below, (POiilT IV). 
Aopellant raises for the first time on this aooeal the claim 
that it had no knowledge of the .July 23, 1971, Judgment on Stinulation, 
and then proceeds to re-hash issues already determined, and beyond 
apoeal, \'/hi le obliquely referring to certain "crucial issues of fact" 
remaining that would bar summary judgment herein 1·iithout showing 
l'1hat those facts may be! In any case, ~ of the other factua 1 issues 
discussed by Appellant, ad infinitum in its brief, were considered 
and adjudicated by the Aori 1 8, 1975, and rlovember 6, 1975, orders, 
after full evidentiary hearings ther~on and if it were possible to 
review such orders (1'1hich this court may not do), whatever findings 
were rendered by the court below the same must be upheld if there is 
any inference whatever to support them in favor of Respondent, 
(POINT V). 
'41.. ' I 
DATED this_!_day of fGA:>r 04«.rJ 1978, and respectfullv sub-
mitted, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
SERVED two copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief upon 
counsel for the Appellant by mailing the same, postage prepaid, 
care of said counsel addressed as follows: 
WENDELL E. BENNETT, ESQ. 
370 East 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Continental Bank Building 
Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 
On this ___ day of ________ l978, 
By: ________ _ 
Residing at: _____ _ 
State of Utah. 
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